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I. INTRODUCTION
Just as there is a tendency for many generals to fight the previous
war, many participants in the struggle for equal opportunity in employ-
ment look mainly at the procedural and substantive issues that en-
cumber enforcement of Title VII and related statutes and see those
as the predominant concerns of the future struggle. However, the past
is only the prelude to the future to the extent that it predicts the
historical tides that will shape future concerns.
In the 1970's, several important substantive issues were recurrently
litigated in both the federal trial and appellate courts. I believe the
key issues for black employees were affirmative action in promotion,
seniority in layoff cases, and the scope of the "discriminatory im-
pact" rule. This rule is based on the assumption that employment
practices are illegally discriminatory when they have a statistically
significant, adverse impact on the employment and/or promotion of
blacks (or other discrete groups like Hispanics or women). The
Supreme Court has recently suggested, in all three of these substan-
tive areas, that the initial definition and description of employment
rights for racial minorities and women are too broad. Thus, through
its opinions, the Court has reduced, though certainly not eliminated,
the rights under Title VIII for blacks, Hispanics, and women.'
Although the scope and applicability of comparable worth as a
remedy for discrimination has not been determined, this issue is an
important concern to women.' However, the issue of seniority in pro-
motions and layoffs has not played as large a role for women as
it has for blacks and other racial minorities.
Neither the courts as they are presently constitituted nor the law
as it is presently construed is likely to do more to increase the economic
position of blacks, Hispanics, or women. This does not mean that Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is superfluous. It does mean that
new strategies must be developed if progress gained through both the
* Associate Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law; B.A., University of Chicago,
1972; M.A., Harvard University, 1974; ED., Harvard Law School, 1978.
I. See infra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
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passage of Title VII and the issuance of executive orders outlawing
employment discrimination by federal contractors is to be sustained.'
Title VII and Reconstruction civil rights statutes,5 as well as the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance (hereinafter OFCC) and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter EEOC), were
successful in reducing racial inequality because of a combination of
three separate but related factors. First, most of the social scientists
who wrote about the economic and social condition of black Americans
during the period following the second world war made public the
fact that there were large differences between blacks and whites in
America and that most of these differences were attributable to large
scale public and private discrimination. Their research frequently
challenged the separate but equal doctrine. In Brown v. Board of
Education,6 the Court, in a famous footnote, cited Gunnar Myrdal's
classic work, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern
Democracy,' which attributed much of the inferior position of blacks
to discrimination. Before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
social scientists had done only limited research into the condition of
black Americans.' The work that did exist attributed much of the
difference in conditions between blacks and whites to public and private
racial discrimination.9 Second, at the time Title VII was passed, at
least a majority of Americans thought discrimination could be con-
quered by effective government action aimed at preventing discrimina-
tion in private employment. Third, social ferment and the belief that
it was imperative for change to happen immediately also led to the
3. Cf. 8:1-2 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. (1984) (special issue on comparable worth).
4, Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965), as amended by Exec. Order No.
1137 , 32 Fed. Reg, 14303 (1967); Exec. Order No. 11478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12985 (1969); Exec.
Order No. 12086, 43 Fed. Reg, 46501 (1978). reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (1982).
5. 42 U.S.C, §§ 1981, 1983 (1982). Reconstruction era statutes, were reinterpreted by the
Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), a case involving housing discrimina-
tion., to eliminate the requirement of state action. In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421
ljUS, 454, 459-60 (1975), the Court confirmed the exter'o:n .f this policy to the employment
situation and cited several lower court decisions which had so held.
6. 347 U.S, 483, 495 n.ll (1954).
7. 0. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY
(1944).
8. See 0, BECKER, THE ECoNoMICs OF DISCRIMINATION (1958); Batchelder, Decline in the
Relative Income of Negro Men, 78 Q.J. ECON. 4 (1964); Hanoch, An Economic Analysis of
Eqrnings and Schooling, 2 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 3 (1967); THOMAS PErnoGW, A PROFILE
0F THE NEGRO AMERICAN (1964).
9: In what has become the most important theoretical social science work on discrimina-
tiol, Qary Becker wrote, "Evidence clearly shows that discrimination is greater against older
and better-educAted nonwhites ... In 1940 .... discrimination in the South appears to have
been. on the average, about twice [of that] in the North .... The average occupational posi-
tion of Negroes has risen quite strikingly in both the North and the South, but their position
relattiy to whites has been remarkably stable; in the North this was only slightly higher in
9 0 than in 1910, and in the South it was slightly lower in 1950 than in 1910."
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passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The civil rights
marches and student sit-ins which prompted Congress to include the
public accommodations sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also
emphasized the need to bring the black worker into the economic
and social mainstream. The political ferment of the black riots of
the 1960's increased the pressure on the political and legal system
to respond.
In key respects the validity of all three of these factors has been
challenged in the 1980's. Some now suggest that discrimination never
played a significant role in the market experience of black Americans
or women. 0 Many now argue that government efforts in this area
have not been and cannot be successful." Even those who attribute
some positive benefit to some aspects of Title VII, question whether
attempts to do more than provide procedural fairness are required,
appropriate, or fair.'" Finally, the need for immediate improvements
in the economic position of black Americans is no longer a para-
mount concern in recent Supreme Court decisions. By limiting the
availability of class actions' 3 and making it more difficult for a plaintiff
to prove discrimination," the Court has made it increasingly difficult
for victims of discrimination to gain access to the courts. This nar-
row approach is very different from that taken by the Court in early
Title VII cases.' 5 Although the courts have not actually adopted the
language of the majority in the Civil Rights Cases'6 that the Negro
who has been aided by beneficent legislation must achieve without
governmental assistance, the result may be the same.
Several problems for enforcement of Title VII are inherent in its
statutory scheme. The model which Congress adopted in its attempt
to eliminate racial discrimination requires individuals to prove
discrimination. Since the availability of class actions has been limited,
10. See, e.g., R.Hioos, COMPETITION AND COERCION: BLACKS IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY
1865-1914 (1977); T. SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? (1984).
II. See, e.g., THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? (1984) (Sowell argues
that affirmative action decisions which he defines as the use of statistical methods did not
increase relative family income of blacks). But see J. Culp, Winnowing Out the Political Chaff
from the Scientific Wheat: Judicial Reliance on Blacks Against the State, MDNM/.MDN M/
(March, 1981) (unpublished manuscript) (Culp argues that the evidence presented by Sowell
does not support this view).
12. NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1975).
13. See, e.g., General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982) (interpreting the Rule 23
class action provision strictly).
14. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). These pro-
cedural roadblocks contrast sharply with the relative procedural ease with which the courts
permitted the plaintiffs to get past the procedural hurdles in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784
v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
15. See discussion infra at 14.
16. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
1985]
RUTGERS L. REV./CIV. RITS. DEVS.
racial and sexual discrimination claims are generally brought by
disgruntled employees. The EEOC and the OFCC can play a role
in the larger enforcement scheme provided they monitor employers
properly. Their efforts have improved the economic position of blacks
to some extent but, at least so far, these efforts have not provided
economic equality for black Americans.1 7 The reach of Title VII is
also limited by the fact that only some employers are covered by the
aforementioned antidiscrimination statutes and executive orders;
employers with less than fifteen employees and no government con-
tracts are not within the purview of administrative regulation." s In
sum, the administrative and judicial scheme is not designed to eliminate
all discrimination.
Additionally, it is important to realize that Title VII reflects Con-
gress' assumption that discrimination has only one character, even
though the law was designed to eliminate discrimination based on race,
sex, or national origin. My colleague Alfred Blumrosen has suggested
that this assumption has been extended to the Age Discrimination
Act even though that act is primarily designed to protect white men
and does not have the same legislative history as Title VII."1 Moreover,
part of the statutory scheme which prohibited discrimination based
on national origin2" has been relatively underutilized, not because such
discrimination has been eliminated, but because it is difficult to prove."
A further factor inhibiting effective enforcement of Title VII is the
dissipation of the consensus which helped to pass the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. When the loss of that consensus is coupled with the
intrinsic difficulties in a plaintiff-enforced statutory scheme, any gains
made through Title VII and other antidiscrimination efforts are in
trouble and future gains are in doubt. Some gains have been made
and are likely to continue under the present scheme. However, if more
improvement in the position of blacks and other minorities is to be
achieved, new and different strategies must be added to existing ones.
In order to find those new strategies, it is important to examine how
the courts have reached their present position and what that position
means in terms of racial and gender differences in employment.
17. See Leonard, Affirmative Action as Earnings Redistribution: The Targeting of Com-
pliance Reviews, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper #1328. (Leonard shows
that the procedural aspects of OFCC have increased black participation); Brown, Black-White
Earnings Ratios Since the Civil Rights Act of 1964: The Importance of Labor Market Dropouts,
99 Q.J. EcoN. 31 (1984) (efforts of EEOC produced some small gains).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(b) (1982).
19. Blumrosen, ADEQ: Intent or Effect, in AGE DISCRIMINATION AND EMPLOYMENT ACT
(Lacy ed., 1982).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 2(a)(2) (1982).
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II. THE STAGES OF AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
Civil rights enforcement has gone through at least three distinct
periods. In the first or "Southern" period, 1965 through 1971, civil
rights actions were brought in the South in an attempt to end the
historic exclusion and segregation of black workers. Proponents of
Title VII were primarily familiar with this kind of discrimination.
Empirical work conducted on the condition of black Americans before
TABLE I
REPORTED TITLE VII CASES*
YEAR NUMBER OF NUMBER IN PERCENT OF
OF TITLE VII SOUTHERN TOTAL
CASES** STATES***
(no earlier cases)
1966 7 6 85.7
1967 32 21 65.6
1968 72 51 70.8
1969 97 58 59.8
1970 141 73 51.8
1971 163 88 54.0
1972 208 101 48.6
1973 299 125 41.8
1974 413 170 41.2
1975 468 192 41.0
1976 626 218 34.8
1977 706 259 36.7
1978 699 222 31.8
1979 741 262 35.4
1980 767 265 34.5
1981 787 257 32.7
1982 776 235 30.3
1983 781 207 26.5
* The volume of cases was garnered using the Lexis search request Title
VII or 42 Pre/5 2000!
** Cases reported by federal district judges and on Lexis sytem.
* Includes 11 states of old Confederacy and the border states of
Oklahoma, Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, and Missouri.
21. See Barta, The Representation of Poles, Italians, Hispanics and Blacks in the Executive
Suites of Chicago's Largest Corporations, National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs, Minority
Report #2, Institute of Urban Life (1984).
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passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 indicated that racial discrimina-
tion was concentrated in the South.22 Table One, which shows the
distribution of reported federal district court cases by region, reveals
that the initial cases were disproportionately brought in the South.
During the 1960's more than 60% of the reported cases were in
the southern states. However, by 1983 only 26.5% of the reported
cases were brought in the South.
In Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 3 decided in 1968, Judge Butzner,
a circuit judge sitting by designation, found that blacks, who were
employed in the Philip Morris Virginia plant, had been improperly
segregated into undesirable departments. Judge Butzner held that the
present effects of past discrimination could not be permitted to con-
tinue. This holding meant that black employees at Philip Morris could
no longer be excluded from jobs in more desirable departments, and
thereby be forced to make a Hobson's Choice between keeping employ-
ment seniority for purposes of layoff and promotion or taking a better
paying job in another department and losing accumulated seniority.2 '
The court in coming to this conclusion accepted the reasoning in a
note in the Harvard Law Review2" which argued that this approach
protected the legitimate interests of black and white employees and
employers.
These early cases were relatively easy to bring and win for several
reasons, Pervasive racial discrimination had existed before the passage
of Title VII; in fact, even after the effective date of the act, July
2, 1965, many employers did not alter their employment policies.2"
In light of these conditions, both plaintiffs and courts were attacking
overt discrimination which was easily detectible.1 During this period
employers admitted both that they discriminated and that they had
explicit policies which required such discrimination. Given these cir-
cumstances, it was easy for judges to recognize, and for plaintiffs
to prove, discrimination.
In ordering Philip Morris to give Quarles a more desirable job as
a truck driver and to allow him to keep his employment seniority,
22. See Batchelder, Decline in (he Relative Income of Negro Men, 78 Q.J.ECON. 4 (1964);
G. BECKER, ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1972), and Hanoch, An Economic Analysis
of Earnings and Schooling,, 2 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 3 (1967) (all three of these studies found
that racial discrimination was greatest in the South, measured in a number of ways). The tables
referred to are included in the Appendix following the text.
23. 279 F. Supp. 505, (E.D. Va. 1968>.
24. Id. at 520.
25. Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1260 (1967).
26. See, e.g., Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. at 507.
27. Thomas Sowell has argued that this, legal period ought to be considered as a period
of equal opportunity where the court was not interested in the results as much as it was in
requiring procedural equality. See Sowell, Affirmative Action Reconsidered, 42 THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 47 (1976) (calling the pre-Griggs period a period of equal opportunity).
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the court gave extensive remedial assistance to a black plaintiff. Thig
case is similar to Griggs v. Duke Power Company,"8 in which black
plaintiffs were able to prove discrimination by showing that the com-
pany's policies had a direct adverse impact on blacks. 9 During thig
period the courts, social scientists, and the public agreed that
discrimination was prevalent and that it had to be attacked by judicial,
administrative, and legislative means.
In many ways this period could be called an age of innocence
because many thought that it would be the only period which would
ever exist. Discrimination, unlike pornography or artistic merit, was
measurable in terms of differential treatment of similarly situated per-
sons. According to this view, all Title VII could or should do for
black plaintiffs was eliminate explicit rules and regulations which
limited the access of blacks to jobs. Professor Winter of Yale
University3" was one very early proponent of this view. In rejecting
the views of Professor Sovern of Columbia University," Professor
Winter argued that the elimination of discrimination was unlikely to
improve the economic position of black Americans. He employed an
economic argument to conclude that "unless anti-discrimination pro-
grams are to operate as preferential systems, they have little to offer
as coercive law."" In other words, as a theoretical matter, legal
pressures could not alter the economic position of blacks. The
economics of this argument can be summarized simply, in well-
functioning markets, discrimination cannot persist unless everyone
discriminates, because otherwise the nondiscriminators will drive out
discrimination. Moreover, discrimination will not be eliminated when
market imperfection limits the ability of competitors to profit by the
elimination of discrimination." Professor Winter's views: had little 9up
port from the academic or legal community. In the age of innoceice,
most people believed that although racial discrimination "eisted, it
could be attacked easily with the tools of persuasion available to the
courts, the EEOC and the OFCC.
What is remarkable about this period of Title ViI erffrmement i,
the small number of reported cases. No district ou rt ca e: were
reported in 1965 and only seven were reported in, 1966 beaums, during
this period, most of the enforcement efforts, took pflace outside the
28. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
29. Id. at 431-32.
30. Now Judge Winter of the Court of Appeals for the Secondl Cirmuf..
31. M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RAcIA DiSCRIMiNATI6N n; EoY , 9rW (1066,
32. Winter, Improving the Economic Status, of Megroes Thr6ugk Law, Algainst Diki,'a-
tion: A Reply to Professor Sovern; 34 U. Cin. L.. REv. 817, 854 (49 6)
33. But see K. ARROW, SOME MODEI.S OF RACLL Dis-mRrwNx1. b~tl rg rfftE: fL6F, ?V.ag,"
(1971) (if there is a market failbre, government car play a role)
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boundaries of the court. Although this situation was probably in large
part attributable to the administrative efforts of the EEOC and OFCC,
it also resulted from the fact that these cases, if brought to court,
would have been easy victories for black plaintiffs.
Before 1964, the power which employers had habitually exercised
in hiring and promotion had been tempered, if at all, only by union-
negotiated limits. Title VII was part of a long series of legislation,
passed during the 1960's and 1970's, which limited the right of the
employer to control the workplace in terms of both hiring3" and health
and safety." As employers lost their innocence about the limits of
their market power in these areas, they stopped many of their most
blatant discriminatory procedures. As a result, discrimination became
much more difficult to identify and prove.
The second period in antidiscrimination law can be called a period
of proof. The most important issue in this period concentrated on
what a plaintiff had to prove in order to win a Title VII case. This
issue became important because businesses had altered their policies.
It was no longer permissible to have blatantly discriminatory employ-
ment policies which excluded blacks or, increasingly, women. Never-
theless, employers retained policies or, in some cases, instituted new
policies which tended to have a disparate impact upon black or female
applicants and employees.
Griggs v. Duke Power Company" was the first of the disparate
impact cases. Before the effective date of Title VII, Duke Power Com-
pany had overtly excluded blacks from advancement within the com-
pany. On the date that Title VII became effective, Duke Power in-
stituted a new requirement for employees seeking placement in depart-
ments other than the company's labor department. They required these
employees to pass two standardized tests and to have a high school
education. Until five months after this suit was filed, all black workers
had been confined to the labor department which, of the defendant's
five departments, paid the lowest wage. Because of the company's
history of racial exclusion and discrimination, it was easy for the Court
to hold that the adoption of a high school education requirement which
effectively excluded a large percentage of potential black applicants
constituted racial discrimination. The plaintiffs presented evidence
which proved (1) 34% of white males but only 6% of black males
had high school educations, and (2) the intelligence tests used by the
34. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982); The
Age Discrimination Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1982); The Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C.§§ 701-96 (1982); Vietnam era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, 38
U.S.C. §§ 2011-14 (1982).
35. See, e.g., Occupational Health and Safety Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1982).
36. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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company excluded a much larger percentage of blacks than whites."
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that
"good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-
in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring
job capability." 3 This simple statement led to a revolution in cases
like Griggs where the potential plaintiff could not show a long history
of total exclusion but could show that practices "fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation"39 had excluded him or her from employ-
ment or promotion. The implementation of this rule had the expected
results: black college graduates, the group which had been most heavily
discriminated against before the passage of Title VII,"' enjoyed an
unprecedented rise in their wage rates and job prospects."' In addi-
tion, blacks who had been excluded from the "white" job market
benefited greatly.
During this second period of antidiscrimination law, which stretched
from 1971 when the Court decided Griggs until 1979, courts began
to question their earlier assumption that racial discrimination could
be inferred from underrepresentation of blacks in the labor force.
For the Supreme Court during this period, the key issue was the quan-
tum of evidence a plaintiff need produce in order to prove discrimina-
tion in a Title VII case. In McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 2
the Court established a four-part method for proving a prima facie
case of individual discrimination or "disparate treatment." ' 3 This case
was the first in a long series of cases which delineated the contours
of proof in both "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact" cases."
In refining these concepts the Court has made it clear that the rele-
vant determinations are those in which discrimination is shown in the
appropriate job market and job categories."' This has tended to make
discrimination cases more complex and discrimination more difficult
to prove.
37. Id. at 430 n.6.
38. Id. at 432.
39. Id. at 431.
40. See Becker, supra note 8 and R. FREEMAN, BLACK ELITE (1976).
41. See Freeman, "Black Economic Progress After 1964: Who Has Gained and Why?,"
in S. ROSEN, STUDIES IN LABOR MARKETS. But see J. SMITH & F. WELCH, RACE DIFFERENCES
IN EARNINGS (1978) (they argue that one should attribute most of the progress in black/white
income ratios to changes in the quality of education of blacks as they have moved from the
South to the North).
42. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
43. Id. at 802.
44. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321 (1977) (plaintiff bears burden of proving policies have substantial impact on women);
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
45. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
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In Furnco Construction Corporation v. Waters," the Court reversed
the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that because of the "historical ine-
quality of treatment of black workers," Furnco Construction had
discriminated against black bricklayers who had not been considered
for employment. 7 The Seventh Circuit had apparently accepted the
age of innocence model and inferred discriminatory animus from both
Furnco's failure to consider potential black bricklayers and its use
of an all-white list of "qualified" bricklayers." In rejecting this analysis
of a view of a Title VII prima facie case, Justice Rehnquist held that
Title VII does not require employers to choose an employment selec-
tion procedure that permits the employer "to consider the qualifica-
tions of the largest number of minority applicants.", 9 Instead, an
employer can articulate a nondiscriminatory rationale for its policies
which disfavor blacks or other protected groups to rebut an inference
of discrimination based solely on adverse impact. This analysis by
Justice Rehnquist ultimately changed Title VII litigation. Even the
historical discrimination shown in Furnco against black bricklayers
was not sufficient in Justice Rehnquist's view to overcome the plain-
tiff's failure to prove that this employer had intentionally
discriminated. 0
The decision in Furnco indicates how far the Court has moved from
the early days of Title VII enforcement. The model of discrimination
employed by the majority is one in which discrimination is not per-
vasive, and employers are often innocent bystanders to the market
inadequacies of blacks, other racial minorities, and women. This view
has been accompanied, if not engendered, by extensive social science
arguments which attack Griggs and the whole notion of racial and
sexual inequality in the labor market.5 ' By the time the Court decided
Furnco, a majority of the justices were convinced that the level of
discrimination did not warrant the assumptions made in the early Ti-
tle VII cases. Furnco presaged the route the Court would take in
Washington v. Davis.2 In this 1981 action, the Court upheld the use
of a standardized entry-level police examination which had not been
validated. The Court concluded that evidence of both the Depart-
ment's efforts to recruit blacks and the racial and ethnic composition
of the police force "negated any inference that the Department
discriminated on the basis of race."5 " Thus practices which could
46. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
47. Waters v. Furnco Constr. Corp. 551 F.2d 1085, 1089 (7th Cir. 1977).
48. Id.
49. 438 U.S. at 576.
50. "We think the imposition of that second requirement simply finds no support either
in the nature of the prima facie case or the purpose of Title Vii." 438 U.S. at 576-77.
51. See supra note 10.
52. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
53. Id. at 246.
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detrimentally impact blacks and women were not illegal so long as
they were not intentional. The Court has not expressly extended these
principles to all Title VII cases, but the Court in Davis did imply
that intrusion by government into the employment process was un-
necessary. s
TABLE II
Supreme Court Employment Discrimination Cases 1979-1984
Procedural Substantive Cases 1979-1984
Type Number
Statute of Limitations 5
Class Certification 3
Res judicata 2
Attorney's Fees 2
Standing 2
Subpoena Enforcements 1
Preemption of State Law 1
Exhaustion 1
Standard of Review I
Burden of Proof 1
Final Order 1
Jury Trial 1
Moot I
Pretrial Communication 1
Disclosure of Information 1
24
Results in Procedural Cases
Employee won I I
Employer won 12
Split I
Results in Substantive Cases
Employee won 12*
Employer won 5**
* Includes Firefighters Local No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984), a
case in which white firefighters successfully challenged a reopened consent
decree.
** Includes United Steelworkers v. Kaiser Aluminum Co., 433 U.S. 193
(1979), in which a white plaintiff sought successfully to prevent a steel com-
pany from voluntarily implementing an affirmative action plan.
54. The lower courts have not always followed the Supreme Court's lead in limiting the
protections of Title ViI. See B. SCHMEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
at 127-29 (2d ed. 1983).
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The most recent stage of American antidiscrimination law is a period
characterized by an inordinate preoccupation with the procedural
aspects of Title VII. Between 1979 and the present, the Supreme Court
has decided approximately forty-two employment discrimination cases.
As Table II indicates, twenty-four of these forty-two cases were
primarily decided on procedural grounds.
Fifty percent of these procedural cases were won either by employees
or the EEOC representing employee interests. This percentage is far
below the 72% employee/EEOC win rate for cases decided on substan-
tive issues. Substantive cases decided by the Supreme Court during
this period include Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts," where
white employees successfully challenged a consent decree which the
Court found impermissibly infringed incumbent white workers'
seniority rights, and United Steelworkers of America v. Weber 6 where
a white worker unsuccessfully challenged an affirmative action train-
ing program. To the extent that these Supreme Court cases reflect
the Court's interest in changing the economic position of black,
Hispanic, and female employees, two conclusions are apparent. First,
the Court appears to be increasingly concerned with procedural issues.
Second, racial minorities and women are more likely to prevail when
the issue before the Court is substantive rather than procedural.
It is important to note that these periods are only a social scien-
tist's rough description of the stages of Title VII enforcement. Cer-
tainly, in each of these periods, there were trends which ran counter
to my rough outline. Such trends may, for example, even invalidate
part of the argument for women or for high status jobs. I leave this
concern to the now voluminous literature which has grown up around
Title VII and the other antidiscrimination efforts of the federal govern-
ment." I believe that the three periods provide a rough approxima-
tion of the judicial history of Title VII enforcement.
55. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
56. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
57. Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARv. L. REV. 945 (1982)
(arguing that the courts have a dual standard for applying Title VII in the evaluation of employers'
hiring and promotion policies. While the more stringent standard, applied to "low-level" jobs,
has been successful in reducing discrimination, the more lenient standard, applied to "high-
level" jobs, has resulted in continued race and other discrimination, a result which is unjustifiable
as a matter of law or policy); Devine, Women in the Academy: Sex Discrimination in Univer-
sity Faculty Hiring and Promotion, 5 J.L. & EDUC. 429 (1976) (Title VI1 has been ineffective
in combatting university employment discrimination because the courts have taken a largely
anti-interventionist position where university hiring and promotion are concerned. The courts
have been reluctant to challenge the university hiring practices which perpetuate discrimination.
The traditional method of selecting instructors perpetuates discrimination against women by
ranking all candidates and selecting the most qualified one, which usually is a man; a less
biased method is the "skill pool" model wherein a group of competent candidates is formed
and from which a balanced selection can be made); Friedman, Congress, the Courts, and Sex-
Based Employment Discrimination in Higher Education: A Tale of Two Titles, 34 VAND. L.
REV. 37 (1981) (arguing, first, that the courts are overly passive and deferential to university
[Vol. 37:4/1
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Table III details how these three stages have influenced the incomes
of black Americans. Blacks made substantial progress through the
first two periods of American antidiscrimination law. However, in
the last stage progress has slowed and actually reversed for older black
employees. This suggests that black progress can be influenced by
an alteration in the Court's commitment to social and economic pro-
gress. This also suggests that division of the antidiscrimination efforts
over these two decades is not simply misplaced concern about the
declining efforts of enforcement authorities.
My outline has largely ignored any differences in how the stages
of American antidiscrimination efforts differentially influenced the suc-
cess of blacks, Hispanics, and women. A complete discussion is beyond
the scope of this paper, but, as one would expect, the civil rights
revolution did not affect all women, blacks, and Latinos in precisely
authorities in reviewing the application of their highly subjective criteria used in making hiring,
promotion, and tenure decisions. Such deference is neither compelled by universities' reliance
on subjective criteria nor is it consistent with Congress' intent under Title VII to eliminate
such discrimination; second, that the intended goals and salutory effect of Title VII are frustrated
by placing on the plaintiff the burden of proving an intent by defendant to discriminate, rather
than requiring the defendant to prove that decisions were non-discriminatory); Waintroob, The
Developing Law of Equal Employment Opportunity at the White Collar and Professional Level,
21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 45 (1979) (noting that the courts have developed a "sliding scale"
approach to the review of employment practices; as the court's estimation of a particular job's
mental difficulty, communication and educational requirements increases, judicial tolerance of
subjective decision-making increases, and the more likely courts are to require complex, par-
ticularized and convincing evidence before finding that a conclusive case of discrimination has
been established; concerns with procedural fairness become more important than the elimina-
tion of subjective hiring practices as the job-level in question increases); Yurko, Judicial Recogni-
tion of Academic Collective Interests: A New Approach to Faculty Title VII Litigation, 60
B.U.L. REV. 473 (1980) (traditional judicial deference to university decisionmakers, in their
employment practices, is declining. The courts must develop an effective and appropriate level
of judicial intervention in the academic decisionmaking process-a type of intervention which
accommodates both the interest of the institution in maintaining freedom to pursue academic
excellence, and the interest of the faculty member in assuring freedom from discrimination.
Neither the increased emphasis on procedural fairness, nor the tendency to undertake court-
supervised institutional reform, would be a desirable successor to complete non-intervention.
The article proposes a third solution in the form of limited judicial deference derived from
intermediate organization theory. The theory recognizes that universities perform both public
and private functions and, to preserve such institutions as entities distinct from government,
including the judiciary, courts must temper their intervention with the recognition of academic
collective interests that benefit society as a whole); Note, Applicability of Federal Antidiscrimina-
tion Legislation to the Selection of a Law Partner, 76 MICH. L. REV. 282 (1977) (Title VII
should be construed to include the prohibition of discrimination in the selection of partners
in a law firm notwithstanding: (1) the concern for associational privacy special to such firms,
(2) the difficulty the courts have in fashioning appropriate relief consistent with the close work-
ing relationships required in law firms, and (3) the highly subjective criteria used in making
partnership decisions); Note, Tenure and Partnerships as Title VII Remedies, 94 HAsv. L. REV.
457 (1980) (arguing that in areas of professional level employment discrimination the usual
remedy of damages such as back pay is inadequate to remedy the denial of tenure or partner-
ship. Title VII authorizes the court to grant more appropriate equitable relief in the form of
an award of tenure or partnership. Such awards are justified because the plaintiff must prove
that he is qualified for the position denied in order to prevail and, further, such an award
is consistent with Title VII's goal of making the plaintiff whole).
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TABLE III-INCOME OF BLACK AMERICANS:
Annual Percentage Changes in Earnings by Age
Ages Pre-1967 to
1967 1967-1975 Absolute
1976-1981 1967-1981"
20-24 -.2 1.3 .0 .85
25-34 0.1 .7 -.4 .21
45-54 0.1 0.1 -.5 -.35
Source: Derived from Freeman, Black Economic Progress After 1964: Who
Has Gained and Why? Table 8.1, in Labor Markets (Sherwin Rosen, ed. 1983).
*Source: Derived from Money Income of Households, Families and Persons
in the United States, 1981, Series P-60, No. 137, Table 45, 142-47.
the same way. Individual differential gains, which are exemplified by
intragroup inequality (differentiates between black, low-income, inner-
city teenagers and black Wall Street lawyers) and intergroup inequality
(differences between blacks and women, or women and Hispanics),
will shape future antidiscrimination employment policies. I hope that
further reflection and study will produce a different and better fourth
stage of antidiscrimination enforcement efforts.
II. THREE PROBLEMS AND ONE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
In a famous article, Paul Brest has suggested that the "anti-
discrimination principle" prohibits employers from making decisions
which disadvantage racial minorities or women, and permeates con-
stitutional interpretation and the passage and enforcement of anti-
discrimination efforts in employment.58 Some supporters of racial
equality suggest that, legally, race is irrelevant; and therefore, the aim
of racial discrimination efforts should be the elimination of any con-
scious use of race. 9 While this principle may be a useful goal or
perhaps even the only equilibrating mechanism capable of sustaining
racial equality in the long run, it ignores the critically important fact
that different racial or sexual groups do not interact in the same way.
In fact, I believe that discrimination presents three problems, rather
58. F. BREST, IN DEFENSE OF THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE (1976).
59. Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, The Supreme Court and the Constitution, 46 U.
Cm. L. REV. 766 (1979).
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than Brest's one, and that these problems interact to create the pre-
sent tensions in antidiscrimination law. The three problems are poverty,
race, and childrearing. Antidiscrimination laws were initially directed
at equalizing opportunity in the face of racial bias. In examining
existing data to determine how successful laws have been in achieving
that goal, it is important to remember that problems of poverty and
childrearing interact with and complicate any initiative aimed at in-
creasing the opportunities of women, blacks and Hispanics.
Table IV shows the percentage of increase in black and Hispanic
employment between 1966 and 1980 in firms with 100 or more
employees.
This increase was greatest in the finance, insurance, and real estate
industries, although there were increases in all industrial groups. In
1966, in firms of 100 or more workers, only 3.7% of the workers
were black; however, by 1980, their employment had increased to
11.3%. Moreover, the distribution of black and Hispanic workers in
large firms is homogeneous. In 1966, the job category with the lowest
TABLE IV
Employment of Black and Hispanic Americans in Firms of 100
Employees for Selected Industries for 1966 and 1980
Year and
Industry Blacks
Division 0 of Total Hispanics
1966 1966 1980 1966 1980
Manufacturing 7.8 11.5 2.4 5.4
Transp. &
Public
Utilities 6.5 10.4 2.0 5.8
Wholesale &
Retail Trade 8.0 10.2 3.7 5.1
Finance,
Insurance,
Real Estate 3.7 11.3 1.9 4.4
Services 13.8 14.8 3.0 5.4
Source: Employment and Training Report of the President, 1982.
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percentage of black workers contained 100o fewer black workers than
did the category with the highest percentage. In 1980, the difference
between the category with the smallest percentage of blacks and the
category with the highest percentage of blacks had been more than
halved. Hispanic workers were initially poorly represented in all in-
dustries; however, their gains have also been distributed evenly among
all industrial groups. Similarly, blacks have made substantial im-
provements in their representation in total employment in both white
and blue collar occupations. Although some of these apparent gains
may be illusory,"0 it is fairly apparent that some are real.
Blacks and women have made similar gains in employment in various
occupational categories for particular firms. By 1978, none of the
twenty largest firms for which data was available had a work force
of less than 80 black or less than 11% female employees.
The penetration of racial minorities and women into these large com-
panies is least in the professional and technical 'categories. Of the eight
companies for which data were available, more than half (5) had a
higher percentage of female than black workers. In both the profes-
sional and technical occupation categories, women generally constituted
a higher percentage of the work force than black workers. Some of
these apparent gains for women are illusory because women are more
likely than men to work only part time. The penetration of women
into the labor forces of smaller companies (for which information
on employment is available) is even more impressive.
The apparent gains are greatest for women in this list of smaller
companies.
In sum, racial minorities and women may have successfully
penetrated into the work forces of large employers, but this success
has not eliminated the other problems they must face. Blacks are still
twice as likely to be unemployed as are whites.' The unemployment
rate of Hispanics is lower than it is for blacks, but it is still much
higher than for white males. White females have historically had a
very high unemployment rate, but now they have an unemployment
rate which is very similar to that of white men. However, many women
are living in poverty because they are the sole support for their
children. Table VI indicates that women who are heads of households
are likely to have between one-third and one-fourth of the income
of their married counterparts.
60. See Phyllis A. Wallace, Title VII and the Economic Status of Blacks, Working Paper
1578-84, Alfred P. Sloan School of Management c(July 1984); Brown, supra note 17.
61. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS
(1983).
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Table VI
Income of Householders by Sex, Race and Selected Age
Categories in 1981
Ages 15-24
Female Householders,
No Husband Present Married Couples
B W B/W B W B/W
% of Total: 55.9 15.4 3.63 37.7 79.0 .477
Median
Income: $4,277 $5,635 .759 $14,014 $16,570 .846
Ages 35-44
% of Total: 43.3 14.3 3.03 53.5 82.3 .65
Median
Income: $8,995 $14,222 .632 $25,064 $30,341 .826
Source: Department of Labor, Employment and Training Report of the
President, 1982.
Women have, as a group, made progress throughout the twenty
years of antidiscrimination enforcement. Of the three prime
beneficiaries of the antidiscrimination efforts, women who are work-
ing full time and do not have solitary child care responsibilities seem
to be least in need of new efforts on their behalf. However, there
is a need for new effort to help women who have substantial child
care responsibilities.
IV. THE EXAGGERATION OF THE DEATH OF GENDER AND RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
One of the few substantive employment discrimination issues decided
by the Supreme Court in its last term was whether Title VII could
apply to partnership choices in law firms. In Hishon v. King &
Spaulding,6 2 an unusual, nearly unanimous court held that Title VII
was applicable to decisions about partnership. This ruling seems to
run counter to the trends of the Court's decision which have made
proving discrimination against high status employers fairly difficult 6 3
62. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
63. See, infra, notes 28-50 and accompanying text.
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To the extent that race and sex are a problem for people with substan-
tial professional training and education, this decision appears to pro-
vide at least some protection and comfort; however, this appearance
is likely to be largely illusory. Employees must still prove they have
been discriminated against in partnerships, and they are likely to see
a potential lawsuit as counterproductive to a successful career.
Table VII-A shows the distribution of black and female partners
and associates by city for a selected group of firms that, like King
& Spaulding, are elite and selective.
TABLE VII-A
Number of Lawyers in Elite** Firms
New York
Washington,
D.C.
Miami
Cleveland
Atlanta
Boston
Kansas City
St. Louis
Chicago
San Francisco
Los Angeles
Dallas
Houston
Seattle
Total Number
of Lawyers
10,052
2,612
311
897
684
942
258
394
2,617
1,887
3,484
532
1,244
539
07o Black % Women
1.5 19.8
Number of Number of
Blacks Women
151 1,997
18.2
11.8
15.0
13.1
20.4
8.5
14.9
18.0
21.4
18.1
15.9
18.0
17.9
* Source: National Association of Legal Placement and the Harvard Law
School Placement Directory
** Elite defined as firms meeting a certain income level depending on city.
It seems appropriate that Hishon is a woman. As Table VII shows,
women constitute a substantial part of the work force of these law
firms. Blacks, however, have been able to achieve a much lower level
of penetration; in no city is the number of blacks greater than 2°7o,
and in Dallas, there are no black lawyers in the seven firms
denominated elite. Table VII-B shows that blacks make up a little
more than 0.5076 of the partners in elite law firms.
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City
New York
Washington
Miami
Cleveland
Atlanta
Boston
Kansas City
St. Louis
Chicago
San Francisco
Los Angeles
Dallas
Houston
Seattle
Total Number of
Partners
3,471
1,143
119
468
340
443
148
183
1,238
778
1,369
223
772
215
Totals: 10,910
Total Black Partners
10
0
2
2
57
There are several possible explanations for the lack of black lawyers
in elite firms. One explanation might be that the supply of qualified
black applicants is too small, but the fact is that the number of black
law students has for several years been substantially higher than 2%.
Alternatively, it is possible that while there are pockets of non-
discriminatory attitudes in some firms, most firms are non-
discriminatory. However, Table VIII shows that there is still a relatively
large group (almost 18%) of law firms with no black lawyers, and
almost half of all firms (47.5%) have fewer than three black lawyers.
It would appear from Table VIII that the presence of black partners
increases the number of black lawyers. In comparison to firms without
black partners, there are approximately twice as many black lawyers
per firm where there is at least one black partner. However, there
is no corollary between the percentage of women and whether there
are black partners in those firms. With and without black partners,
female lawyers constitute approximately 20%, or 32 women per firm.
To the extent that racial and sexual discrimination are connected, the
absence of black partners can influence the access of blacks, but not
women, to jobs in prestigious law firms.
This example suggests the power and the limitation of internal
pressure on employers. The presence of black partners doubles the
NEW EMPLO YMENT POLICY
TABLE VII-B
Distribution of Black Partners
in Elite Firms
RUTGERS L. RE V./CI V. RITS. DEVS.
TABLE VIII
Impact of Having Black Partners on the
Number of Black Lawyers in Firms
[Vol. 37:4/1
All Firms
Firms with no
black lawyers
Firms with only one
black lawyer
Firms with only two
black lawyers
Total firms with less
than two black
lawyers
Firms with no black
partners
Firms Without black
partners
Firms with black
partners
Number of Percent of Number of Number of
Firms Firms Partners Associates
All Firms All Firms
125 100.0 8,460 11,591
13
57
10.4
47.2
73 58.4%
Lawyers Per Firm
Black Lawyers Women Lawyers
32.01
31.5
Total .Lawyers
155.9
157.9
number of black lawyers in prestigious firms. Nevertheless, this change
in absolute terms is still very small. In firms with black partners,
the number of black lawyers averages less than four per firm.
Apparently the fact that blacks hold key positions can affect the
number and distribution of blacks in law firms, but their presence
is unlikely to have the immediate effect of putting minorities into
an equal position with their white counterparts. Those who rely on
nondiscriminatory employers to end the economic isolation of racial
minorities must examine the limits of individual and market forces
for change, Even among persons with high levels of education, blacks
and whites differ in job experience. In order to improve the position
of racial minorities and women, a strategy must be developed which
takes such differences into account.
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V. BUILDING TOWARD A NEW STATE IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION
ENFORCEMENT
As Section II of this paper suggests, efforts to eliminate racial
discrimination were most effective in the period when there was a
consensus that racial discrimination existed and that it had to be directly
attacked and eliminated. It seems unlikely, particularly in light of the
overwhelming mandate given to an administration that employs William
Bradford Reynolds as Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights,
that the federal government will be an ally of increased efforts to
alter employment policies.
To the extent that a federal civil rights policy exists in the Reagan
Administration, the policy is based on the assumption that blacks have
not reached parity with whites because government intervention has
prevented market forces from working. Thus, all of the federal efforts
the Administration has suggested for ending racial discrimination are
market-enhancing procedures. These include lowering the minimum
wage and creating enterprise zones in which tax and government
policies do not apply. This approach is really government inaction.
Moreover, it ignores the possibility that the market will not cure all
problems.
While blacks have made substantial progress in gaining access to
jobs, there is recent evidence that there has been a decline in the percen-
tage of blacks and an increase in the percentage of women in
prestigious law firms in all of the cities surveyed in Table VII. In
addition, evidence suggests that gains in relative income especially for
older black workers have been leveling off and perhaps even receding.
Before a new employment policy can be successful in the rest of
the 1980's, those interested in altering the economic position of racial
minorities and women must address these problems. First, some groups
are not reached by Title VII protection because they lack the skills
necessary to obtain access to jobs. The jobs that are available to them
are often either (1) in companies which are outside of the purview
of Title VII and other federal antidiscrimination regulation or (2) in
positions where there is little incentive on the part of potential plain-
tiffs to bring suits.
Second, the success of Title VII enforcement in providing access
to jobs does not necessarily make it possible for blacks or women
to complain of discriminatory treatment. A black lawyer in a
prestigious law firm who has been treated differently from his white
counterpart would find it difficult to prove disparate treatment and
would also have a strong personal incentive not to be seen in his.
profession as a troublemaker.
Additionally, the courts have been reluctant to act against profes-
sions which exclude new members based on race or sex despite the
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long history of such exclusion. Unless we alter these policies, the dismal
rate of black penetration into white professions will continue.
Third, the federal government is unlikely to provide substantial new
resources to attack unequal distribution of personal resources. The
large budget deficit and the Reagan Administration's commitment to
military expenditures produced a substantial drop in the amount of
resources allocated to education and job training. Any new civil rights
initiative must take account of this federal policy of inaction regarding
racial minorities. In sum, if we are to make a down payment on reduc-
ing racial inequality in the 1980's, we must understand that it will
not come from federal resources or impetus. The consensus of the
age of innocence does not exist and is unlikely to be recreated.
As indicated above, a remarkable feat has been accomplished by
imposing on large employers the requirement that they provide equal
access to jobs for racial minorities. However, the same pressure has
not been placed on those groups to require their business associates
to provide the same access. IBM, which has a fairly good record on
hiring racial minorities, spends large sums of money for the services
of Cravath, Swaine and Moore, a firm which now employs no black
lawyers. It is important that black groups, in putting pressure on large
employers, not ignore the potential power that such employers have
to change the corporate policy of others. All companies should be
encouraged to contract only with firms which adopt affirmative action
guidelines. In addition, racial minority and female employees should
understand that it is important for them to use their positions to open
up more opportunities in their companies. If government regulation
is not going to play a leading role in ending discrimination, individuals
will have to play a larger part.
In 1964 when Title VII was passed, black political power was in
its infancy. The Voting Rights Act has altered that situation. 6' Any
new civil rights policy must attempt to utilize those areas of govern-
ment where political leverage still exists. New efforts must entail a
change in focus from executive and administrative programs at the
federal level to local and state programs, as well as to congressional
efforts to require state, local and federal contractors to employ racial
minorities and women. However, even more can be done. Racial voting
pluralities exist-inside cities such as Newark and Philadelphia, and
these municipalities are spending tremendous sums of money on
64. See CULP AND DUNSON, Brothers of a Different Color, INNER CITY MINORITY YOUTHS
(Freeman and Holzer, ed.,1986), forthcoming.
65. See A. Slocum, Politics and Voting: The Black Dilemma (unpublished manuscript).
66. W. Viscusi, Race, Schooling and Employment Patterns: Log Linear Probability Models
of Young Men, REPORT TO ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION (1979).
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everything from subway cars to schoolbooks. Cities which have
substantial black populations should join together to use the invest-
ment of some of these resources as leverage to achieve greater minority
hiring. This will take coordination and sophistication by local and
state leaders, but such efforts can eventually result in new jobs for
the victims of poverty and racism.
Municipal and state legislation to set aside contracts for minority
contractors is only the initial step in the effort to end discrimination.
Cities should try to increase the demand for the services of disadvan-
taged minority youth. A program incentive can be devised for sup-
pliers of municipal services, both to hire poor teenagers and to locate
in central cities.
Finally, a new policy directed at ending racial discrimination must
reject the Brest argument that in general race and sex are not useful
policy instruments. Race still plays a large role in the way a black
employee is treated in the American labor market. W. Kip Viscusi
has suggested that if we put all black teenagers in the same position
as white teenagers, the current labor market transitions (temporary
layoff, quitting, job loss due to plant closing) would push black
teenagers back into their original inferior socio-economic position in
three years.66 Such results suggest that it is critically important not
to solely focus our efforts on general strategies to alleviate poverty
or undereducation (though of course we should support the eradica-
tion of such conditions); rather, we must develop comprehensive policy
that appropriately takes account of race.
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